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CASENOTES

TORTS:

ANOTHER CITADEL CRUMBLES-OHIO ABOLISHES THE

OF CHARITABLE IMMUNITY-Albritton v. Neighborhood Centers Association for Child Development, 12 Ohio St. 3d
DOCTRINE

210, 466 N.E.2d 867 (1984).
Charity suffereth long and is kind, but in the common law it cannot be
careless. When it is, it ceases to be kindness and becomes actionable
wrongdoing.*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Within the past two years, the Ohio Supreme Court has begun a
crusade against immunity as a viable defense. The assault began with
Enghauser Manufacturing Co. v. Eriksson Engineering Ltd.,' wherein
the supreme court repudiated the 200-year-old doctrine of sovereign
immunity' by announcing that "[i]f municipalities are to expose people
and their property to negligent acts, then they must expect to respond
to suit."' 3 In the wake of the Enghauser decision, it is not surprising

* President of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (Rutledge, J.) (emphasis added).
I. 6 Ohio St. 3d 31, 451 N.E.2d 228 (1983). Enghauser sued the city of Lebanon, Ohio,
alleging that the city's negligent construction of a bridge and roadway caused Enghauser's property to be flooded. The Ohio Court of Appeals for the Twelfth District sustained the trial court's
reversal of a verdict for the plaintiff, holding that the city was protected by sovereign immunity.
Id. at 32, 451 N.E.2d at 230. The Ohio Supreme Court subsequently reversed the court of appeals' decision and reinstated the original verdict. Id. at 36, 451 N.E.2d at 233.
2. The doctrine of sovereign immunity was, in actuality, judicially abrogated in Haverlack
v. Portage Homes, Inc., 2 Ohio St. 3d 26, 442 N.E.2d 749 (1982). The Haverlack opinion, however, was unclear as to whether the abolition was limited specifically to the facts of that case, or
applicable to all municipalities. The Enghauser decision was, therefore, a clarification of the
Haverlack decision.
The Ohio General Assembly has subsequently reinstated, in a limited form, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. H. 176, which was signed into law on November 20, 1985, provides blanket
immunity for municipalities from suits arising from the performance of governmental functions.
See Act of November 20, 1985, 58 OHIo ST. B.A. REP. 1907 (1985) (to be codified in scattered
sections of chs. 1, 3, 5, 7, 33, 47, and 55 OHIo REV. CODE ANN.). See also Dayton Journal
Herald, Nov. 21, 1985, at 3, col. 2; Agreement Reached on Sovereign Immunity Proposal,
Gongwer News Service, Inc., Ohio Report, Nov. 13, 1985, at 1-2. Although local governments
and governmental agencies will still be exposed to liability arising from the performance of
propreitary.functions, a $250,000 limitation is placed on awards for claims of pain and suffering.
Legis-letter, 58 OHIO ST. B.A. REP. 1906, 1906 (1985).
3. Enghauser, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 35, 451 N.E.2d at 232.
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that the Ohio Supreme Court soon broke through another antiquated
barrier-the doctrine of charitable immunity.'
It is apparent that the court is attempting to abolish legal anachronisms and propel immunity doctrines into the twentieth century, for
just one year following the demise of sovereign immunity, the Ohio Supreme Court attacked charitable immunity. In Albritton v. Neighbor5
hood Centers Association for Child Development, the court extended
the Enghauser rationale to charitable organizations,' thereby abolish7
ing the doctrine of charitable immunity. Accordingly, charitable institutions are now subject to tort liability, just as is any corporation or
individual.
This note will trace the doctrine of charitable immunity in Ohio
from its inception to its recent demise, via the Albritton decision. In
addition, this note will consider the justifications for the immunity, as
well as the arguments in favor of abolition.

II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

The appellant, Alfreda Albritton, brought suit against Neighborhood Centers Association for Child Development (NCA) in 19818 after
her daughter was injured 9 at a day care center operated by the defendant. NCA, a nonprofit organization, contended that it was immune
10
from civil liability under the doctrine of charitable immunity. NCA
moved for, and was granted summary judgment, after which Albritton
moved for relief from judgment pending submission of further pleadings. " Albritton's motion was granted, whereupon NCA again moved
for summiry judgment on the ground that the doctrine of charitable
immunity protected it from liability for the injury to Albritton's daugh4. See Albritton v. Neighborhood Centers Ass'n for Child Dev., 12 Ohio St. 3d 210, 466
N.E.2d 867 (1984). This casenote is an analysis of the Aibritton decision. For a synopsis of the
facts and holding of the Albritton decision, see infra notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
5. 12 Ohio St. 3d 210, 466 N.E.2d 867 (1984).
6. Id. at 214, 466 N.E.2d at 871.
7. id.
8. Another defendant, The Eleanor B. Rainey Memorial Institute, Inc., was dismissed in
1982 pursuant to entering into a covenant not to sue with the plaintiff. The Institute, like NCA,
was a nonprofit organization, and housed the day care center where the injury to Albritton's
daughter occurred. Id. at 210, 466 N.E.2d at 867.
9. Albritton's five year old daughter was injured when a partition fell on her foot, fracturing
the child's bone. Albritton v. Neighborhood Centers Ass'n for Child Dev., No. 45375, slip op. at I
(Ohio Ct. App., 8th Dist. May 12, 1983) (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
10. Albritton, 12 Ohio St. 3d at 210, 466 N.E.2d at 867.
II. Id. Albritton, in opposition to NCA's motion for summary judgment, alleged that NCA
was a quasi-governmental organization rather than a charity and, therefore, was subject to liability under the Enghauser ruling abolishing sovereign immunity. Id. at 211, 466 N.E.2d at 869.
Albritton, however, failed to present any specific evidence to disprove NCA's charitable status. Id.
NCA, on the other hand, presented proof that it was a nonprofit organization. Id.
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ter. 2 The trial court's second grant of NCA's motion for summary
judgment was sustained by the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Eighth

District."3

In a five to two decision, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the
lower court's decision, holding that a corporation, merely because it is
organized for charitable purposes, is not immune from liability for its

tortious conduct. 14 Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court abolished the doctrine of charitable immunity.
III.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Development of the Doctrine of CharitableImmunity

1. The Rise of the Immunity
The American doctrine of charitable immunity, established in McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital,'5 balances precariously
upon mere dicta contained in two English cases. 16 This dicta stated that
using trust funds to satisfy tort damages violates both the purpose of
the trust and the charitable donor's intent and, consequently, should
not be permitted.17 Subsequently, this rationale was adopted in a third
English case, Holliday v. St. Leonard,'8 which the Massachusetts Supreme Court relied upon in reaching the McDonald decision. 9 Thus,
absolute immunity for charitable institutions stumbled into American
common law. It is important to note, however, that Holliday and another of the English cases, which form the foundation for the American
doctrine of charitable immunity, were overruled"0 several years prior to
the McDonald decision.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court apparently acted with12. Id. at 210, 466 N.E.2d at 868.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 214, 466 N.E.2d at 871. Justice William B. Brown authored the majority opinion,
in which Chief Justice Frank D. Celebrezze, and Justices William A. Sweeney, Clifford F. Brown
and James P. Celebrezze concurred. Dissenting opinions were issued by Justices Ralph S. Locher
and Robert E. Holmes.
15. 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
16. Feofees of Heriot's Hosp. v. Ross, 12 Clark & Fin. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846);
Duncan v. Findlater, 6 Clark & Fin. 894, 7 Eng. Rep. 934 (1839).
17. Ross, 12 Clark & Fin. at 513, 8 Eng. Rep. at 1510. It is interesting that neither Duncan
nor Ross dealt with personal injuries resulting from the operation of a charity. In Ross, the action
was one for wrongful exclusion from a hospital. Id. at 507, 8 Eng. Rep. at 1508. Duncan held only
that highway trustees were not liable for the negligence of persons not under their command. 6
Clark & Fin. at 894, 7 Eng. Rep. at 934.
18. 11 C.B. 192, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (1861).
19. McDonald, 120 Mass. at 436.
20. Holliday, which was relied upon in the McDonald decision, was overruled by Foreman
v. Mayor of Canterbury, 6 L.R.-Q.B. 214 (1871). Duncan was overruled by Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, I L.R.-E. & 1. App. 93 (1866).
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21
out the knowledge that Holliday had been overruled. Nevertheless, if
one considers the doctrine's "early reversal, and its acceptance in this
country in disregard or ignorance of that fact, the historical foundation
crumbles. The fault in the foundation accounts in part for the weakness
22
later disclosed in the structure erected on it." Inadequacies in the
foundation of any legal doctrine naturally lead to misapplications of,
exceptions to, and dissatisfaction with the general rule. Such has been
the case with the doctrine of charitable immunity.

2.

The Decline of the Immunity

The first major criticism of the doctrine of charitable immunity

23
appeared in President of Georgetown College v. Hughes, wherein
Justice Rutledge attacked each of the arguments supporting the charitable immunity doctrine. 2 This highly acclaimed opinion is regarded as
25
the beginning of the demise of charitable immunity. Recognizing the
validity of Justice Rutledge's criticisms, courts and scholars alike began
scrutinizing not only the immunity's tenuous foundation, but also its
alleged justifications. 26 But even prior to the Hughes decision, the immunity was slowly being eliminated as courts, in a step-by-step process,
27
created exceptions to the "rule" of absolute immunity for charitable
organizations. Such was the case in Ohio.

21. See President of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
The Hughes court criticized the McDonald court, stating: "Apparently [the court] acted in ignorance of the English reversal. In any event, they resurrected in America a rule already dead in
England, and thereby gave [the] dictum a new lease on life in the New World." Id.
22. Id. at 817.
23. 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942). In Hughes, the plaintiff-nurse was struck and injured by
a swinging door pushed open by a student nurse. Id. at 811. The court of appeals, in affirming a
lower court decision for the plaintiff, held the defendant-hospital liable for the negligence of its
employee. Id. at 827-28. Justice Rutledge, who authored the Hughes opinion, later became a
United States Supreme Court Justice and served from 1943-49. M. SHAPIRO & R. TRESOLINI,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 772-73 (6th ed. 1983).
24. Hughes, 130 F.2d at 822-25. For a discussion of the justifications for the doctrine of
charitable immunity and those considerations that mitigate against its continued recognition, see
infra notes 55-96 and accompanying text.
25. "Prior to 1942 only two or three courts had rejected the immunity of charities outright.
In that year a devastating opinion of Judge Rutledge . . .reviewed all of the arguments in favor
of the immunity, and demolished them so completely as to change the whole course of the law."
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 133, at 996 (4th ed. 1971) (footnote omitted).
26. See, e.g., Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957);
Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965); Fisch, Charitable Liability
for Tort, 10 VILL. L. REV. 71 (1964).
27. The "rule" of charitable immunity is not actually a rule, but is instead an exception to
the general rule of liability for one's tortious conduct. Therefore, the courts created exceptions to
charitable immunity that are, in reality, exceptions to the exception. See Hughes, 130 F.2d at 817.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/6
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Charitable Immunity in Ohio

The doctrine of charitable immunity was established in Ohio in
the 1911 decision of Taylor v. Protestant Hospital Association. 8 In
Taylor, the Ohio Supreme Court refused to hold a nonprofit hospital
liable for injuries to a patient which resulted from the negligence of one
of its employees.2 9 The Taylor court's stance of providing absolute immunity for hospitals did not, however, endure. In 1922, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a nonprofit hospital was not immune from liability for tortious conduct if it failed to use reasonable care in selecting its
employees.3 0 Consequently, just eleven years after the doctrine of charitable immunity was recognized in Ohio, the first exception was formulated. Other exceptions soon followed, so that immunity was denied: (1)

if the injured party was not a "beneficiary" of the institution;3 1 (2) if

the charity operated an income-producing enterprise not directly related to the purpose for which the institution was organized; 2 or (3) if
the injured party paid for the services rendered by the charity.3 8 Finally, the Ohio Supreme Court decided that nonprofit hospitals were
entitled to no immunity whatsoever in Avellone v. St. John's Hospital.34 Thus, the court succeeded in gradually dissolving the rule of

28. 85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N.E. 1089 (1911). In Taylor, the plaintiff alleged that his wife had
died due to an employee-nurse's negligence in counting surgical sponges. Id. at 91, 96 N.E. at
1089. The hospital contended it was immune from liability because it was a charitable institution.
Id. at 91-92, 96 N.E. at 1090.
29. Id. at 103, 96 N.E. at 1092. In 1938, charitable immunity was subsequently extended to
all charities. Waddell v. YMCA, 133 Ohio St. 601, 15 N.E.2d 140 (1938).
30. Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home & Hosp., 104 Ohio St. 61, 74, 135 N.E. 287, 291
(1922). Although immunity was extended to all charities, 16 years after Flower, in the 1938
Waddell decision, the immunity was limited to that enjoyed by charitable hospitals because reasonable care had to be exercised before immunity was granted. Waddell, 133 Ohio St. at 606, 15
N.E.2d at 143.
31. Sisters of Charity v. Duvelius, 123 Ohio St. 52, 173 N.E. 737 (1930). Charitable institutions were held liable to "strangers" to the organization just as any other corporation would be.
Id. at 61, 173 N.E. at 740. Obviously, there was great difficulty distinguishing between a "beneficiary" and a "stranger." A "stranger" was generally considered to be one who received no direct
benefit from the hospital, such as a person visiting a patient or an employee. See Lipson, Charitable Immunity: The Plague of Modern Tort Concepts, 7 CLEVE.-MAR. L. REV. 483, 492 (1958).
32. Blankenship v. Alter, 171 Ohio St. 65, 167 N.E.2d 922 (1960) (bingo game).
33. Bell v. Salvation Army, 172 Ohio St. 326, 175 N.E.2d 738 (1961). In Bell, the plaintiff
paid for lodging at the Salvation Army. Id. at 326, 175 N.E.2d at 739. It should be noted that if a
charity receives compensation for the services it provides, it is still considered a charity and qualifies for immunity so long as such payments are used for charitable purposes and are not for profit.
W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 133, at 992.
34. 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956). In reaching its decision, the Avellone court
considered various so-called "public policy" justifications for the immunity, but rejected them,
stating: "Whatever the reason for the public policy that gave rise to the rule of immunity, public
policy today, examined in the light of present day conditions, will not support such a rule." Id. at
476, 135 N.E.2d at 416.
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charitable immunity on an ad hoc basis.
This gradual dissolution ended, however, with Gibbon v. YWCA, 5
wherein the Ohio Supreme Court refused to extend the Avellone complete liability principle to any charities other than hospitals. 6 Hence,
although the Ohio Supreme Court denied absolute immunity to charities in some situations, the court remained unwilling to deny immunity
in all situations.
The Ohio Supreme Court's fluctuations as to when, and which,
charities would be granted immunity placed the doctrine in a state of
chaos, necessitating further judicial review of the doctrine of charitable
immunity. Albritton v. Neighborhood Centers Association for Child
Development3 7 became the instrument for this review.
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Abolition of the Doctrine of Charitable Immunity

In Albritton v. Neighborhood Centers Association for Child Development,3 8 the Ohio Supreme Court examined and abolished the doctrine of charitable immunity, concluding that the doctrine "is not an
ironclad, sacrosanct rule but has been severely limited in its actual application."'3

9

The Albritton court, therefore, found no compelling prece-

dential or public policy reasons to sustain charitable immunity.4 The
court also held there was no merit to the Neighborhood Centers Association's (NCA) contention that the court should defer to the Ohio General Assembly for abolition of the doctrine of charitable immunity.4 1
According to the court, because the doctrine was judicially created, the
courts, rather than the Ohio General Assembly, had the power and
duty to examine it. 42 If such examination should reveal that the doc-

35. 170 Ohio St. 280, 164 N.E.2d 563 (1960).
36. As the Ohio Supreme Court observed in retrospect, "In the Avellone case ... the court
felt that changed modern operating conditions of nonprofit hospitals required it to reject and
abandon the previously declared public policy. Similarly compelling reasons are not established to
at 293, 164 N.E.2d at 572. The Gibbon
Id.
I..."
the satisfaction of the majority in this case .
court relied heavily upon stare decisis considerations "if for no other reason, [than] to avoid retroactive imposition of liability on a charitable institution which would result from the declaration of
a different public policy." Id. at 280, 164 N.E.2d at 564 (court syllabus).
37. 12 Ohio St. 3d 210, 466 N.E.2d 867 (1984).
38. 12 Ohio St. 3d 210, 466 N.E.2d 867 (1984).
39. Id. at 212, 466 N.E.2d at 870.
40. See id. at 210, 466 N.E.2d at 867.
41. Id. at 214, 466 N.E.2d at 871.
42. Id. The court stated that it should review such judicially created doctrines in light of
reason, changes in public policy, and the functions of the organization involved. Id. (citing Enghauser Mfg. Co. v. Eriksson Eng'g. Ltd., 6 Ohio St. 3d 31, 33, 451 N.E.2d 228, 230 (1983)).
Furthermore, in deciding cases such as the one at bar, the court noted that a balancing of rights
was involved: A charitable organization's right to receive any possible advantages and assistance
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/6
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trine is no longer practical or equitable, the judiciary should make the
necessary corrections.4 Finally, the Ohio Supreme Court reviewed preexisting public policy regarding the necessity of charitable immunity.
In the early twentieth century, social attitudes and mores were protective of charitable institutions.4 4 Public policy, therefore, dictated that
because charities were organized with the intent to benefit society,
nothing, including tort liability, should interfere with this philanthropic
goal.' 5
The Albritton court rejected the public policy theory, advancing
four reasons for doing so. First, an injury is no less painful or costly
simply because it is inflicted by a charitable institution rather than a
noncharitable one.' 6 Second, when no compensation is received for an
injury inflicted through "charitable" negligence, the victim or his family often becomes dependent upon other charitable or governmental institutions. 47 Third, granting charities immunity from their negligence
essentially forces the uncompensated victim to make an unwilling contribution to that charity. 48 Finally, the dissenting argument that liability will discourage volunteerism and contributions, thereby enabling
only the large charities to survive,' 9 was dismissed by the Albritton
court which noted that these concerns have not materialized in those
jurisdictions which have abolished the doctrine.50 Based on these reasons, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the doctrine of charitable
immunity would no longer be a viable defense in Ohio.
The Albritton dissent,5 1 however, thought that the majority took
an overbroad position by abolishing the charitable immunity defense
for all charitable organizations.12 Justice Locher, in his dissenting opin-

must be weighed, according to the court, against an individual's right to receive compensation for
injuries caused by another's negligence. Albritton, 12 Ohio St. 3d at 213, 466 N.E.2d at 870.
43. Albritton, 12 Ohio St. 3d at 214, 466 N.E.2d at 871.
44. See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
45. See Albritton, 12 Ohio St. 3d at 213, 466 N.E.2d at 870.
46. Albritton, 12 Ohio St. 3d at 213, 466 N.E.2d at 870. The court noted that it is ironic
that an institution organized to aid the public should be relieved of compensating those injured by
such aid. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. In reality, injured victims are contributing an amount equal to that which they
would have received had they been injured by a noncharitable corporation. Id.
49. Id. at 216, 466 N.E.2d at 873 (Locher, J., dissenting). For a complete discussion of
Justices Holmes' and Locher's dissents, see infra notes 51-54.
50. Albritton, 12 Ohio St. 3d at 214, 466 N.E.2d at 871.
51. Although Justice Locher concurred with Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion, Justice
Locher also offered his own separate dissenting opinion. See id. at 215, 466 N.E.2d at 872. It is
interesting to note that these two justices also dissented in Enghauser Mfg. Co. v. Eriksson Eng'g
Ltd., 6 Ohio St. 3d 31, 37, 451 N.E.2d 228, 233 (1983). As indicated previously, the Enghauser
case abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
52. Albritton, 12 Ohio St. 3d at 215, 466 N.E.2d at 872 (Locher J., dissenting).
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ion, maintained that the court should have retained its case-by-case
method 53 of dealing with the immunity. Had this been done, NCA
been found liable, yet all Ohio charities would not have
would still have
54
affected.
been
Although the dissent raised valid arguments, the majority opinion
was soundly reasoned. Nevertheless, the majority invoked only a few
justifications for the abolition of charitable immunity. In so doing, numerous other policy factors which are equally relevant and which could
have provided further support for the court's holding were ignored.
B.

Denouncing Charitable Immunity-The "Other" Policy Factors

1. The Four Theoretical Bases for the Immunity
Before examining the justifications for the abolition of charitable
of
immunity, the basis of the immunity must be explored. Proponents
55 to suptheories
four
upon
relied
charitable immunity have generally
port their positions, ordinarily utilizing some combination of the theories, rather than relying on any single one.
The trust fund theory is the oldest of the four theories, and is con56
sidered the fundamental basis of the charitable immunity doctrine.
This theory asserts that charitable funds comprise a trust which is to be
administered for the charity's beneficiaries.57 Accordingly, satisfying
tort claims from the trust fund would so deplete the trust that it would
become difficult, if not impossible, to conduct the charity as originally
intended. 58 As an additional justification, advocates of this theory insist
that using trust funds to satisfy tort claims serves to defeat the original
gratuitous intent for which donations were given.59
53. The case-by-case method of applying the charitable immunity doctrine, according to
Justice Locher, recognizes that all charities are not the same because they differ in size, funding,
and the types of services provided. Id. at 215, 466 N.E.2d at 872 (Locher J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 217, 466 N.E.2d at 873 (Locher, J., dissenting). NCA is a government-funded
charity. The dissent argued that if the majority had retained its case-by-case analysis, the result
would have been liability only for government-funded charities as opposed to all charities. Id.
55. See infra notes 56-76 and accompanying text. Various courts and commentators have
recognized these four theories as the major theories supporting the doctrine of charitable immunity. See, e.g., President of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Horty,
The Status of the Doctrine of Charitable Immunity in Hospital Cases, 25 OHIo ST. L.J. 343,
344-45 (1964); Lipson, supra note 31, at 484-85, 488-90; Comment, Charitable Immunity: A
Diminishing Doctrine, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 109, 113-14 (1966); Annot., 25 A.L.R. 4TH 517,
522-23 (1983).
56. This theory was relied upon in McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432
(1876), the case which introduced the theory of charitable immunity into American common law.
See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
57. See Hughes, 130 F.2d at 823, 825; Horty, supra note 55, at 344; Lipson, supra note 31,
at 484-85.
58. Horty, supra note 55, at 344.
59. See Hughes, 130 F.2d at 825; Horty, supra note 55, at 344; Lipson, supra note 31, at
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/6
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The trust fund theory might be plausible if it were strictly adhered
to so that all persons are barred from recovering against a charity. Instead, the trust fund theory has been applied inconsistently. Strangers
have been allowed compensation for injuries inflicted upon them by a
charity while beneficiaries have been denied compensation for the same
injuries *0 Selective application of the theory does little to protect a
charity's trust funds. They are still depleted, regardless of who is compensated. Moreover, people do not ordinarily donate to a charity with
the specification that the donation be exempt from tort claims.61 Consequently, there is little foundation for the claim that the theoretical "donor's intent" is violated by allowing tort recovery, especially to beneficiaries." Finally, critics of the trust fund theory indicate that charities
have not suffered, nor have donations decreased, in those states which
retain no immunity. 63
The second theory, which responds to the imposition of liability
under the doctrine of respondeat superior, contends that vicarious liability is inapplicable to charitable organizations." Under the doctrine
of respondeat superior, employers are liable for those torts committed
by their employees while within the scope of their employment.6 5 The
imposition of liability on employers is considered a quid pro quo for the
benefits they receive from their employees."6 Naturally, claims against
charities arise out of the misfeasance or nonfeasance of their employ-

484-85. Donors supposedly do not intend that their funds be used to satisfy tort claims. As stated
by the McDonald court:
The [charitable organization] has no capital stock, no provision for making dividends or
profits, and whatever it may receive from any source it holds in trust to be devoted to the
object of sustaining the [charity] and increasing its benefit to the public, by extending or
improving its accommodations and diminishing its expenses.
. . . The funds intrusted to it are not to be diminished by such casualties, if those
immediately controlling them have done their whole duty in reference to those who have
sought to obtain the benefit of them.
McDonald, 120 Mass. at 435-36.
60. Lipson, supra note 31, at 485. For an explanation of the stranger-beneficiary distinction,
see supra note 31.
61. Lipson, supra note 31, at 485.
62. Hughes, 130 F.2d at 822-23. Justice Rutledge carried this proposition even further: "If
the matter is regarded as 'diverting the fund to persons not within the class intended for aid,' it is
impossible to assume that the donor intends everyone except the special object of his bounty to
have reparation. If any assumption were justified, it would be exactly the contrary one." Id. at
825-26.
63. See, e.g., Albritton, 12 Ohio St. 3d at 214, 466 N.E.2d at 871; Flagiello v. Pennsylvania
Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 503, 208 A.2d 193, 201 (1965). The late Dean Prosser stated, "There is not
the slightest indication that donations have been in any way discouraged, or charities crippled in
states which deny all immunity." W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 133, at 994.
64. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 55, at 114.
65. H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 52, at 101 (1979).
66. Id.
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ees. This theory purports, however, that because charities are nonprofit
organizations and derive no benefit from their employees, the doctrine
of respondeat superior is inapplicable.6"
The weakness in such an analysis of respondeat superior is that
courts which embrace the analysis interpret the principles behind vicarious liability too narrowly. Respondeat superior does not depend so
much upon whether employers benefit from their employees' services,
6 8
but rather upon the degree of control they have over their employees.
Certainly a charitable organization exercises control over its employees,
regardless of whether they are volunteers. Hence, the doctrine of respondeat superior should be applicable to charitable institutions, just as
it is to any other employer. Advocates who contend otherwise demonstrate an artificially narrow, if not wholly incorrect, understanding of
respondeat superior.
The third theory, the implied waiver or assumption of risk theory,
proposes that beneficiaries, 9 upon entering a charitable institution,
waive any right to recover for injuries inflicted while at the institution.70 Therefore, because beneficiaries seek the benefits of a charitable
institution, they supposedly assume the risk of injury.7
This theory fails when the elements of assumption of risk are considered. To assume a risk, a person must know of that risk, understand
the danger presented from it, and yet voluntarily expose himself or herself to that risk.7 2 Persons entering charitable institutions do not usually fall within the purview of these requirements. Consider, for example, a severely injured or unconscious person, an infant in a day care
center, or an indigent with no alternative but to seek charitable assistance.7 3 None of these persons can intelligently, knowingly, or volunta-

67.
68.

Horty, supra rote 55, at 345; Comment, supra note 55, at 114.
H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 65, § 5, at 11; Lipson, supra note 31, at

486.
69. This theory applies solely to situations where a beneficiary is involved. Lipson, supra
note 31, at 486.
70. See Hughes, 130 F.2d at 826; Lipson, supra note 31, at 488; Comment, supra note 55,
at 113-14. Proponents of this theory equate implied waiver with assumption of risk. That is, for
purposes of the implied waiver or assumption of risk theory, no legal distinction is made between
the two theories. The Arizona Supreme Court explained the lack of legal distinction between the
theories of implied waiver and assumption of risk by stating that "when one enters a [charitable
institution] . . . he by accepting the services rendered him, waives all right to claim damages for
injuries suffered as a result of the negligence of the [charity] or its employees. In other words he
assumes the risk of negligence." Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 27, 230 P.2d 220,
223 (1951).
71. See Hughes, 130 F.2d at 826; Lipson, supra note 31, at 488; Comment, supra note 55,
at 113-14.
72. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS. R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 68, at 487 (5th ed. 1984).
73. See Hughes, 130 F.2d at 826 (noting that infants, insane persons, and injured, although

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/6

1985]

CASENOTES

rily assume any risks or waive any rights. Thus, because the assumption of risk requirements cannot be satisfied in most, if not all,
charitable tort situations, the implied waiver or assumption of risk theory is inapplicable.7 4
Finally, the public policy theory, broadly stated, forbids imposition
of charitable liability because the beneficial effects of a charitable organization purportedly outweigh the detrimental effects of uncompensated injuries to individuals. 75 The Ohio Supreme Court ultimately
adopted this theory as the justification for the doctrine of charitable
immunity. 76 Because the public policy theory is the most controversial
of the four theories, it has spawned some of the best arguments for the
abolition of the charitable immunity doctrine.
2.

Public Policy Now Favors the Abolition of Charitable Immunity

With the change in time comes changes in social norms and mores
and, as a result, previously acceptable public policy often becomes outmoded or invalid. Accordingly, the policy, as well as the laws upholding
that policy, must be tempered to reflect the times. Such has been the
case with charitable immunity. The Albritton court recognized this
need for reform, but failed to recognize the social and legal changes
which have negated the public policy justifications that previously supported the doctrine of charitable immunity.
Quite simply, the conditions which formerly prompted immunity
for charities no longer exist in today's society. 77 At the turn of the century, when charitable immunity became part of American common
law, 78 charities were perceived as struggling, small-time operations. 79

conscious, adults are unable to assume the risk of injury); See also Lipson, supra note 31, at 488;
Comment, supra note 55, at 113-14.
74. Even the conscious adult seeking the benefits of a charity is not in the position to make
any voluntary waivers. The average person simply does not think about whether he or she will be
injured while at the charitable organization, and thus cannot willingly agree to assume a risk he or
she does not know of. This approach is consistent with the requirements of assumption of risk.
75. Comment, supra note 55, at 114. The public policy theory is not really separate and
distinct from the others. It is actually an incorporation of all or some of the other theories, when
convenient, in order to grant immunity. Id.
76. This position was described in the Avellone case:
Up to this point in the development of the law, this court has apparently felt that the
benefit to society as a whole, gained by granting immunity, weighed the former right in
favor of the latter, and this was on the ground that . . . immunizing them was "a valuable
aid in securing the ends of justice."
Avellone v. St. John's Hosp., 165 Ohio St. 467, 473, 135 N.E.2d 410, 414 (1956).
77. See Lipson, supra note 31, at 495. See also Hughes, 130 F.2d at 824; Comment, supra
note 55, at 117.
78. Charitable immunity was brought to American common law through McDonald v.
Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876). See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
79. It is no wonder that charities were viewed in this way. A typical defense of a charity
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The funding of these early charities depended solely upon whatever donations were received. To avoid depletion of trust funds and to encourage altruistic persons to continue their admirable work, immunity
from tort liability was granted.8" This protection, however, is no longer
necessary:
The hardships and burdens of charitable organizations of the past have,
to a large extent, ceased to exist. These institutions of today have, in
many instances, grown into enormous businesses, handling large funds,
managing and owning vast properties, much of it tax free by statute, set
up by large trusts or foundations, enjoying endowments and resources
beyond anything thought of when the matter of immunity was first considered. They have a capacity for absorbing loss which did not exist even
a few decades ago. 81
Not only are today's charities operated like businesses, but liability
insurance has become more accessible. 82 Persons injured because of a
charitable institution's negligence can now be compensated by the insurance company instead of the charity. Although purchasing liability
insurance will undoubtedly deplete a charity's coffers, the expense of
insurance is negligible compared to the benefit society receives when
another class of tort victims is compensated. 3 Furthermore, the cost of
endless litigation to debate the immunity versus liability issue will be
avoided. 84 More importantly, the costs of any litigation regarding a
charity's alleged negligence will be borne by the insurance company

was stated as follows:
[The defendant] is a corporation not for profit maintaining and operating a charitable hospital at a loss, the deficit being made up by charitable gifts; that its funds are derived from
donations, gifts, bequests, and such income as it may receive from patients who are able to
pay; and that there are patients who are not able to pay and are cared for by defendant as
a matter of charity.
Avellone, 165 Ohio St. at 467, 135 N.E.2d at 411 (defendant St. John's Hospital's answer to
complaint of plaintiff Avellone).
80. Lipson, supra note 31, at 491.
81. Noel v. Menninger Found., 175 Kan. 751, 758, 267 P.2d 934, 939 (1954) (Wertz, J.).
82. See Hughes, 130 F.2d at 823-24; Avellone, 165 Ohio St. at 475, 135 N.E.2d at 415;
Lipson, supra note 31, at 495-96.
83. Other operating expenses, such as salaries, rent, and fire insurance premiums, are presently paid from the trust fund. Adding liability insurance coverage will not so significantly increase the amount paid for such items that a charity would be forced into operating at a loss.
Lipson, supra note 31, at 495.
Justice Rutledge espoused a similar argument in Hughes, stating that because charities were
already required to obtain liability insurance covering strangers, adding beneficiaries to the covered group would not significantly increase the charity's expenses. Hughes, 130 F.2d at 827-28.
He further called for a balancing test in which the cost to the charity in adding such insurance to
its operating overhead should be weighed against the cost to the individual in bearing a negligently inflicted injury for which he or she is not compensated. Id. at 824. Obviously, Justice
Rutledge was of the opinion that the injured party should prevail.
84. Lipson, supra note 31, at 495.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/6
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rather than the charity. 85 In effect, liability insurance will protect the
charity's trust funds, which could possibly result in an increased financial benefit for the charity.
Because liability insurance is now more accessible, public policy is
better served when the injured individual, rather than the charity, is
protected. This rationale is evidenced by the concept of loss spreading.8" Under this concept, the victim alone no longer bears the burden
resulting from another's negligence in the operation of an enterprise.
Instead, the burden is shifted to the community at large and distributed amongst those who benefit from the services they receive. 87 Thus,
the acceptance of loss spreading signifies a shift in society's concern
from the institution-whether it be a corporation or a charity-to the
individual.
The concept of spreading the loss to protect the individual is actually a reflection of the whole foundation of tort liability, which holds
individuals responsible for their own wrongdoing. 88 Generally, liability
is the rule and immunity, granted only in certain situations, is the exception. When the situations necessitating the immunity no longer exist, neither should the immunity. Moreover, if one considers Justice
Rutledge's suggestion that it is the "tendency of immunity to foster
neglect and of liability to induce care and caution,"89 one returns full
circle to the general principles of tort liability. Consequently, public
policy should, as it recently has, dictate that a charitable organization
be liable for its own wrongdoing.

85. Liability insurance enables one to be compensated for injuries received from a charity's
negligence. When there has been an injury at a charitable institution, which results in a claim
against that institution, the insurance company has a contractual obligation to compensate the
victim, if compensation is proper.
The insurance company decides whether it will satisfy the claim. If the company believes the
charity was not negligent, it may decide to try the case. All costs of litigation are, however, borne
by the insurance company, not the charity. See generally R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § 7.6
(1971).
86. Hughes, 130 F.2d at 827; Lipson, supra note 31, at 501.
87. See. e.g., Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 36, 230 P.2d 220, 229 (1951).
The Ray court spoke of various legislative enactments, such as workers' compensation and occupational disease disability laws, under which the burden of bearing such losses is removed from the
individual and is instead placed upon the public at large. Id. at 36, 230 P.2d at 229. The court
further explained that such legislative enactments are declarations of public policy in favor of the
individual, and that the general public is made to bear the burden through the levying of taxes,
either indirectly or directly, to carry out the policy. Id. The court finally concluded that with the
advent of the loss spreading concept public policy was no longer a justification for charitable
immunity. Id. See also Hughes, 130 F.2d at 827; Lipson, supra note 31, at 501.
88. See Hughes, 130 F.2d at 814 n.14.
89. Id. at 824. Justice Rutledge was probably correct. As organizations strive for avenues to
avoid liability, perhaps by using more caution during the dispensing of services, the number of
careless injuries will be reduced. This, in turn, will further protect the trust funds, as insurance
premiums
will not have 1985
to be continuously raised in order for the charity to retain coverage.
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Proponents of charitable immunity believe that total abolition of
the doctrine, in order to reflect the theory of tort liability, will lead to a
decrease in contributions received and benefits provided.90 These proponents believe that this decrease will, in turn, result in the eventual destruction of the charitable institution. 91 Evidence, however, fails to support such speculations. 92 Charities still thrive in those states which have
eliminated the immunity.93 Moreover, it appears that proponents of
charitable immunity forget that the existence of liability insurance can
counteract this concern.
It also appears that charitable immunity advocates overlook the
paradox created by denying compensation to beneficiaries of charities.
Beneficiaries are the most unlikely persons to be in a position to bear
the consequences of an uncompensated injury. Yet, ironically, as a result of the numerous exceptions to the rule of absolute immunity, beneficiaries have consistently been denied recovery while others have been
compensated. 94 Revoking charitable immunity altogether will remove
this paradox and place the beneficiary in the position originally intended-benefitted, not burdened, by the charity.
90. Id. at 823. See also Albritton v. Neighborhood Centers Ass'n for Child Dev., 12 Ohio
St. 3d 210, 216, 466 N.E.2d 867, 873 (1984) (Locher, J., dissenting).
91. See Hughes, 130 F.2d at 823. See also Albritton, 12 Ohio St. 3d at 217-18, 466
N.E.2d at 873 (Locher, J., dissenting).
92. See Albritton, 12 Ohio St. 3d at 214, 466 N.E.2d at 871.
93. Hughes, 130 F.2d at 827; Lipson, supra note 31, at 492. But cf. Canon & Jaros, The
Impact of Changes in Judicial Doctrine. The Abrogation of Charitable Immunity, 13 LAW &
Soc. REV. 969 (1970). Commentators Canon and Jaros compared the increase in hospital roown
rates in states which have abrogated the immunity with states which have not. This comparison
led the commentators to conclude that the abrogation has resulted in a marked increase in hospital room rates. Id. at 969. However, the study also reports that Ohio moved from full immunity to
complete abrogation in 1956, the year of the Avellone decision. Id. at 973 (Table 1: Changes in
the Status of the Charitable Immunity Doctrine, 1942-74). A study of the legal history of charitable immunity in Ohio shows this to be false. See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
Given this discrepancy, the Canon and Jaros report is of questionable validity. Moreover, as stated
by the late Dean Prosser, there have been no significant changes regarding charities in those states
which have abolished the immunity:
[T]he argument [that the abolition of charitable immunity will result in the eventual destruction of charities] appears to have been concocted out of defense counsel's head rather
than to have arisen out of any reality of experience. There is not the slightest indication
that donations have been in any way discouraged, or charities crippled in states which deny
all immunity.
W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 133, at 994 (citation omitted). The Albritton dissent, however, cited
the Canon and Jaros study as authority for its position. Albritton, 12 Ohio St. 3d at 217, 466
N.E.2d at 873-74 (Locher, J., dissenting).
94. Lipson, supra note 31, at 492. Those favoring the immunity say that donors' charitable
intentions are thwarted if their contributions are used to satisfy tort damages. See Hughes, 130
F.2d at 823, 825; Horty, supra note 55, at 344; Lipson, supra note 31, at 484-85. However,
donors' intentions to give aid to those who need it are also thwarted when injured parties are
denied recovery for injuries sustained at the very institution to which the donors' contributions
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/6
were made.
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Finally, stare decisis must be considered. Undoubtedly, it is a well
respected and valuable means of preserving our legal system.95 Stare
decisis is not, however, infallible. Blind adherence to any doctrine,
merely in the interest of consistency, promulgates injustice. The Ohio
Supreme Court addressed stare decisis as applied to the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, and stated:
[W]hen a rule of law is judge-made, and the reasons for its use have
vanished, the court should not perpetuate it until petrification. A rule
that has outlived its usefulness should be changed. Greater justification
is needed for a rule of law than that it has been part of the common law
for a few hundred years.9 6
The Ohio Supreme Court also recognized the inequities created by adherence to stare decisis when applied to the doctrine of charitable immunity. 9 Accordingly, the Albritton case was the conduit for change.
The Ohio Supreme Court undoubtedly made the right decision to
overrule the doctrine of charitable immunity, because it is no longer
defensible. Nevertheless, it is disturbing that the court relied solely
upon the few reasons recited in its opinion,8 thereby excluding other
reasons 99 which equally support the immunity's rescission. Because the
Albritton majority failed to write a more inclusive and detailed opinion
as to why it abrogated the doctrine of charitable immunity, it is apparent that the dissent was not convinced that abrogation was the proper
method to correct the immunity's shortcomings.
V.

APPLICATION OF THE ABROGATION

Another problem, and perhaps the most serious problem with the
Albritton decision, was the failure of the Ohio Supreme Court to specifically address the issue of retroactive versus prospective abrogation
of the doctrine of charitable immunity. However, because Albritton
was reversed and remanded,10 0 the court evidently intended that the
immunity's rescission be applied retroactively. 10 Technically, the Al-

95. Enghauser Mfg. Co. v. Eriksson Eng'g Ltd., 6 Ohio St. 3d 31, 34, 451 N.E.2d 228, 231
(1983).
96. Id.
97. Albritton, 12 Ohio St. 3d at 213-14, 466 N.E.2d at 870-71.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 46-50.
99. See supra notes 77-96 and accompanying text.
100. 12 Ohio St. 3d 210, 215, 466 N.E.2d 867, 871 (1984).
101. The decision in Albritton fails to address the application of the abrogation of the doctrine of charitable immunity. This casenote, however, takes the position that the Ohio Supreme
Court intended that its decision be applied retroactively because the case was "remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings." Id. There is legal precedent for retroactive application of the
abrogation. See, e.g., Jackson v. Doe, 296 So. 2d 323 (La. 1974); Myers v. Drozda, 180 Neb. 183,
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britton court may apply the abrogation of the doctrine retroactively in
accordance with Great Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil & Refining
Co. 102 In Great Northern Railway, the United States Supreme Court
held that the highest court of a state, when overruling a previous civil
decision, may choose to apply that ruling prospectively, retroactively, or
both. 0 3 These alternatives are available whether "the subject of the
new decision is common law or statute."' 4 Furthermore, when a legislative enactment affects procedural rights, as opposed to substantive
rights, there is no bar to applying the law retroactively. 0 The United
States Supreme Court has stated that this rule is equally applicable to
a court decision overturning a common law rule, 06 as the Albritton
decision has done to charitable immunity. Generally, a "substantive
law is [one] which creates duties, rights and obligations, while [a] procedural or remedial law prescribes methods of enforcement of rights or
' 10 7
obtaining redress."
Arguably, when the Albritton court abolished charitable immunity
it merely removed a procedural defense previously granted to charitable institutions, thereby avoiding infringement upon any substantive
rights. Consequently, it may be argued that the abolition of charitable
immunity could be retroactively applied without violating due process.
It is more probable, however, that the abolition of the charitable
immunity defense does infringe upon substantive rights:
"Where before a defendant was shielded from liability . . . it no longer
enjoys such protection. Where before a plaintiff . . . was denied recovery, he is now . . .entitled to damages." Clearly, no modification could
be more substantive than that which imposes upon one party the obligation to compensate and grants another the right to be compensated
where before neither such duty nor such entitlement existed.' 8

Millard Fillmore Hosp., 91 A.D.2d 1179, 459 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1983) (order affirming propriety of
retroactive application of abrogation of doctrine of charitable immunity).
102. 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
103. Id. at 364-65.
104. Id. at 365.
105. See Wilfong v. Batdorf, 6 Ohio St. 3d 100, 103-04, 451 N.E.2d 1185, 1188 (1983);
Denicola v. Providence Hosp., 57 Ohio St. 2d 115, 117, 387 N.E.2d 231, 233 (1979); State ex rel.
Holdridge v. Industrial Comm'n., II Ohio St. 2d 175, 179, 228 N.E.2d 621, 624 (1967) (citing
State ex rel. Slaughter v. Industrial Comm'n, 132 Ohio St. 537, 9 N.E.2d 505 (1937)).
106. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 628-29 (1965). The Supreme Court addressed
whether the decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), requiring exclusion of illegally seized
evidence in state criminal trials, operated retroactively. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 619-20. The Court
held that it did not, but indicated that retroactive application is not prohibited by the Constitution. Id. at 620, 629.
107. Holdridge, II Ohio St. 2d at 178, 228 N.E.2d at 623.
108. Wilfong, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 106, 451 N.E.2d at 1191 (Locher, J., dissenting) (quoting
Viers v. Dunlap, I Ohio St. 3d 173, 175, 438 N.E.2d 881, 883 (1982)). Both Wilfong and Viers
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/6
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The above quotation, while addressing the abolition of contributory negligence, applies equally to the abolition of charitable immunity.
In the past, charitable institutions were not always obligated to compensate injured persons.1" 9 Now, however, charitable institutions are
not shielded from liability and plaintiffs are not denied recovery.
Surely, then, the abrogation of the charitable immunity defense affects
substantive, rather than procedural rights. Although it is clearly within
the Ohio Supreme Court's power to apply the abrogation of charitable
immunity retroactively, it was unwise to do so. Instead, the Albritton
court should have prospectively rescinded the doctrine of charitable immunity, as has been done in other jurisdictions which have abolished
the immunity."'
The dissenting opinion in Enghauser Manufacturing Co. v. Eriksson EngineeringLtd.' advocated prospective application of the abolition of sovereign immunity. According to the dissent of Justice Holmes,
if the abrogation of sovereign immunity was applied retroactively, municipalities which had previously relied upon the doctrine would be denied the "opportunity to make arrangements to meet the new liability
to which they [became] subject.""'
The Enghauser dissent's reasoning supporting prospective application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity is equally pertinent to the
doctrine of charitable immunity. As with municipalities, liability insurance will enable charities to meet their new obligations. This cannot be
accomplished, however, if charities are unable, because of either the
lack of funds or time, to obtain the insurance. The financial hardships
certain to befall charitable institutions which have formerly relied upon
charitable immunity could have been avoided had the Albritton majority applied the doctrine's rescission prospectively.
Prospective application of the abrogation is further substantiated
by the Ohio Constitution, which prohibits the Ohio General Assembly

tion was held to affect substantive rights and, therefore, could not be applied retroactively. Viers,
I Ohio St. 3d at 174, 438 N.E.2d at 883. Wilfong, however, overruled Viers, holding that because
the abolition of contributory negligence as an affirmative defense merely affected procedural
rights, it could be applied retroactively. Wilfong, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 103, 451 N.E.2d at 1188. It is
asserted that Justice Locher more correctly characterized the abolition of contributory negligence
as affecting substantive rights. Because the doctrine of charitable immunity is also a defense, it is
analagous to the contributory negligence defense, and hence, the same analysis should apply.
109. See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 101. See also Annot., 25 A.L.R. 4TH 517, 523 (1983); 15 AM. JUR. 2D
Charities § 194, at 235-36 (1964).
IlI. 6 Ohio St. 3d 31, 37, 451 N.E.2d 228, 233 (1983) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
112. Id. The Enghauser dissent stressed that it made little difference that liability insurance
will mitigate the costs associated with the newly imposed liability, because if the abrogation were
Published
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from enacting retroactive laws." 3 Although the Ohio Constitution does
not contain a similar provision which forbids courts from retroactively
imposing decisional laws, public policy would seem to dictate that in'
the interest of fairness, courts should not do so." '
Perhaps the Ohio Supreme Court intended retroactive application
only for the Albritton case. If so, the possibility exists that yet another
charitable immunity decision will be necessary to clarify the court's intent, as occurred with the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 1 15 This possibility could have been avoided had the majority simply declared that
the abolition of the doctrine of charitable immunity will be applied
prospectively." 16
VI.

LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY AFTER THE ABOLITION

As of yet, the Ohio General Assembly has not made an attempt to
reinstate charitable immunity. That does not, however, mean that such
an attempt will not be made in the future. In 1959, three years after
Avellone v. St. John's Hospital,17 the Ohio General Assembly introduced a bill" 8 which provided for the reinstatement of charitable im-

113. The Ohio Constitution provides:
The General Assembly shall have no power to pass retroactive laws, or laws impairing the
obligation of contracts; but may, by general laws, authorize courts to carry into effect, upon
such terms as shall be just and equitable, the manifest intention of parties, and officers, by
curing omissions, defects, and errors, in instruments and proceedings, arising out of their
want of conformity with the laws of this State.
OHIO CONST. art. II, § 28.
114. Until the Enghauser and Albritton decisions, it appeared that the Ohio Supreme Court
advocated such a policy because the court previously held: "The constitutional prohibition against
retroactive laws is a 'protection for the individual who is assured that he may rely upon the law as
it is written and not later be subject to new obligations thereby.' " State ex rel. Shady Acres
Nursing Home, Inc. v. Rhodes, 7 Ohio St. 3d 7, 10, 455 N.E.2d 489, 492 (1983) (quoting Lakengren v. Kosydar, 44 Ohio St. 2d 199, 201, 339 N.E.2d 814, 815 (1975)). Although the Ohio
Supreme Court was referring to protection of the ifidividual, there is no reason why such protection should not be extended to' organizations. Apparently, the Ohio Supreme Court does not
"practice what it preaches."
15. For a brief explanation of the judicial abolition of sovereign immunity, see supra notes
1-3 and accompanying text.
116. Although the abrogation of charitable immunity will be applied retroactively, the consequences might not be as devastating as one might initially believe because of the statute of
limitations applicable to torts. Under Ohio law, an action for bodily injury must be brought within
two years after it occurs. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (Page Supp. 1984). Additionally, a
minor must bring a cause of action within two years after the age of majority is reached. Id. §
2305.16 (Page 1981). Thus, the actual number of cases that could be litigated because of the
retroactive application of the abrogation of charitable immunity will probably be less than
anticipated.
117. 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956).
118. Substitute Senate Bill No. 241 provided:
A nonprofit corporation, society, or association organized exclusively for religious, charitable, educational or hospital purposes shall not be liable by reason of the acts of its servants
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/6
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munity for hospitals except in cases of gross negligence by an organization's employee. The bill was, however, vetoed by the Governor,11 9 and
although it subsequently passed a Senate re-vote, it failed in the
House.1 0 Moreover, the general assembly has recently reconsidered the
Ohio Supreme Court's 1983 abrogation of sovereign immunity. H.
176,121 which was enacted on November 20, 1985, has partially reinstated immunity for municipalities.1 22 Thus, although the Ohio Supreme Court acknowledges the waning importance of immunity doctrines, the Ohio General Assembly may not be ready to do the same, as
it indicated by its recent enactment of H. 176. Consequently, it is conceivable that the legislature could attempt to reverse the Albritton de-

cision through statutory enactment.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Under Albritton v. Neighborhood Centers Association for Child
Development,1 23 Ohio charitable institutions are no longer immune
from liability for their tortious conduct. Given the mottled history of
charitable immunity in Ohio, the Ohio Supreme Court's definite stance
on the immunity is long overdue. Total abrogation of the immunity will
provide uniform treatment of all charities, as well as definite guidelines
as to when liability will be imposed. Although this may seem unfair to
smaller charities, special exceptions should not be made for individual
charities. This paternalistic attitude resulted in the immunity's previous
state of disarray.
Nevertheless, the victory of the abolition of charitable immunity is
degree of the works or services of such nonprofit corporation, society, or association, unless
such injuries or death are caused by the gross negligence of the agent or servant of such
corporation, society, or association acting within the scope of his employment.
Payment to a nonprofit corporation, society, or association for its works or services
shall not exclude a person from being in the class of a beneficiary of such works or services.
Gibbons v. YWCA, 170 Ohio St. 280, 285-86, 164 N.E.2d 563, 567 (1960). The bill passed the
Senate by a vote of 29 to 1. Sub. S. B. No. 241, 103d Ohio General Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess., 128
OHIO SENATE J. 599, 599 (May 20," 1959). It also passed the House by a vote of 93 to 32. Gibbons, 170 Ohio St. at 285, 164 N.E.2d at 567. Such a wide margin indicates the vehemence with
which the abrogation of the doctrine was attacked. Perhaps the present Ohio General Assembly
will feel as strongly about this issue. However, given the many public policy changes that have
occurred in the 25 years since the bill was introduced, the present legislature may not seek to
reinstate the immunity, or at least not to the extent that the 1959 General Assembly did.
119. The Governor explained that his veto grew out of concern for an individual so severely
injured through employee negligence that he or she could not earn a living, whether such negligence Was gross or de minimis. Governor's Veto Message, 128 OHIO SENATE J. 1393, 1393 (Aug.
14, 1959) (Gov. Michael V. Disalle).
120. Gibbons, 170 Ohio St. at 285, 164 N.E.2d at 567-68.
121. Act of November 20, 1985, 58 OHIo ST. B.A. REP. 1907 (1985) (to be codified in
scattered sections of chs. 1, 3, 5, 7, 33, 47, and 55 OHIO REV. CODE ANN.).
122. See supra note 2.
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tainted. The Ohio Supreme Court relied upon only a few justifications
for the abrogation of the immunity, thereby excluding numerous other
justifications which are equally important. Because the Albritton majority failed in this respect, it also failed to convince the dissent that the
doctrine should be destroyed. Such a failure resulted in a split in the
court where there could have been unanimity.
A unanimous decision abolishing a chaotic rule, such as the doctrine of charitable immunity, would undeniably have more precedential
value than a split decision. Because a unanimous decision speaks with
more finality, the majority should have strived for unanimity. Because
it did not, however, the Albritton decision could give rise to future litigation, as it becomes necessary to interpret the exact meaning of the
holding.
Still, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized that the doctrine of
charitable immunity was outmoded and produced inconsistent and unjust results. Accordingly, the court abolished the doctrine and should
be commended for doing so.
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